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Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Implementing 
Land Reform and Combating Climate Change in 
Brazil’s Amazon Under Law 11.952.091 
Angeline Thomas 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LAND PROBLEM 
Brazil is a land of contrasts. According to the United Nations, it is the 
fourth most economically unequal country in the world.2 In the face of 
enormous productive capacity, a dazzling geographical landscape, awe-
inspiring natural resources, and amazing cultural diversity, millions of 
Brazilians suffer from hunger, malnutrition, and lack of access to basic 
social services. Unequal distribution of land—harking back to the 
Portuguese colonization of Brazil hundreds of years ago—is a signature 
cause of the human inequalities.3 It has created enormous divisions in 
society between giant landowners—who grow crops like sugar, soy, and 
citrus for export—and the 4.6 million families with no access to land to 
grow food for their children.4 Landless and rural people face malnutrition; 
lack access to clean water, sanitation, and basic health or education 
services; and spend a lifetime in roadside shantytowns of black plastic tents. 
The focus of this article is whether a new law passed in 2009 entitled 
“Legal Land: Accelerated Quieting of Title to Land in the Legal Amazon” 
(“Terra Legal: Regularização Fundiária Acelerada na Amazônia Legal”)5 
will benefit these landless farmers. 
Brazil’s land problem is not the lack of land, but rather that its abundance 
of land is in the hands of very few people who have been resistant to let it 
go. Though the Brazilian constitution authorizes the expropriation (or 
taking) of large unproductive estates that are not serving a “social function,” 
the Brazilian government has routinely avoided using this mechanism to 
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redistribute land to poor landless farmers. Consequently, land tenure in 
Brazil is amongst the most unequal in the world.6 For example, the Gini 
index is one standard economic measure used throughout the world to 
assess the degree to which the distribution of income, or some other 
resource, is unequal. For instance, a society that scores 0.0 on the Gini 
index has perfect equality in income distribution. Where a country that 
scores 1.0 indicates a total inequality where only one person corners all the 
income. Thus, each percentage point over 0 indicates higher amounts of 
inequality.7 In 2006, Brazil reached 0.872 on the Gini index measuring land 
distribution.8 This means that Brazil has almost total unequal land 
distribution. 
Traditional expropriative land reform attempts have been met with an 
overwhelming number of obstacles in Brazil. Historically, powerful 
alliances of large landowners, politicians, and conservative actors have 
blocked any significant attempt to enforce the constitutional mechanisms in 
place to institute meaningful reform.9 Instead, they used their influence to 
push for increased development, subsidies for large export crops, and low 
taxes. To appease landless families, the Brazilian government substituted 
policies of colonization, resettlement, and market-assisted land reform in 
place of widespread redistribution of land through expropriation. The 
government often looked to the Amazon, a region of abundant land that was 
largely untitled (i.e., no legally recognized owners), as a potential panacea 
to provide land and economic opportunity to the landless as well as satisfy 
Brazil’s development needs. However, though some of these policies 
enjoyed limited success in that landless families did acquire land and were 
able to make a living, none of these policies have been widespread enough 
to cure the land problem. 
Furthermore, for those peasants who were beneficiaries of government-
sponsored settlement projects in the Amazon—or part of increased 
voluntary migration—acquiring land came at a price of social unrest and 
violence, a substantial part of which stems from conflicts over land 
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ownership. Due to the fact that land was so abundant, that a peasant could 
acquire rights to use the land simply by showing up and cultivating it for a 
year and a day, and that the land titling procedure was too difficult and 
complicated for many peasants to understand, many never acquired 
ownership title to the land they occupied. As a result, many were vulnerable 
to evictions from someone claiming to be the owner of land even if their 
claims were false, fraudulent, or illegal. People who preyed on peasants are 
known in Brazil as “grileiros,” or “land-grabbers.”10 Instead of defending 
their legitimate claim, many peasants preferred to move on to another plot 
nearby and start over rather than deal with a grileiro’s hired guns, or 
government bureaucracy they could not understand. 
Another unfortunate consequence of government policies like these was 
massive deforestation in the Amazon region. Large land owners were 
responsible for much of the deforestation that occurred in this region, 
because they could exempt their properties from being eligible for 
expropriation if they showed a “rational use.” In the Amazon Basin, a land 
owner could show rational use if he cleared a forested area or used the land 
to graze cattle, which also required clearing forested areas and planting 
savanna type grasses to feed the livestock.  
However, subsistence farmers also contributed to deforestation. In order 
to prepare forested land for cultivation, it must be cleared first, and the 
easiest way to do this for a peasant farmer is with fire—also known as 
slash-and-burn agriculture. Rural farmers contributed to deforestation 
because they faced two obstacles. First, soil quality in the Amazon often 
declined after two years and rural farmers often did not have access to 
technical assistance, like fertilizer, to help extend the productivity of a 
particular plot. Therefore, they would leave the old infertile plot for cattle 
grazing or for waste as they moved on to another plot to start the process 
over again. Second, because rural farmers were vulnerable to eviction from 
land grabbers, they would have to find a new plot, again starting the process 
over. 
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Though Brazil currently has many environmental laws designed to 
protect the Amazon from deforestation, the sheer size of the Amazon— 
together with the fact that land ownership in this region is uncertain—
makes enforcement of environmental laws extremely difficult. 
Agrarian reform has been a crucial issue in Brazil during at least the last 
half century.11 Social movements made up of rural farmers, like the 
Movement of Landless Workers (MST), have continued to demand that the 
government institute land redistribution, address poverty, and protect the 
environment. Both domestic and international environmental groups are 
simultaneously calling for reduced deforestation in the Amazon to help stop 
climate change. Also, a strong agricultural lobby remains a dominant 
political force interested in large-scale mechanized agricultural 
development. 
In June of 2009, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva introduced the 
Sustainable Amazon Plan—a six-branch policy aimed at land redistribution, 
poverty alleviation, and fighting deforestation.12 The subject of this article, 
Law 11.952.09—one of the principal pieces of legislation intended to 
implement the plan—was passed by presidential decree in June 2009 and 
approved by Brazil’s Congress shortly thereafter. The law is aimed at 
killing two birds with one stone. On one hand, the law is designed to give 
land rights to squatters occupying public land in the Amazon, thereby 
dealing with the problem of land redistribution and rural violence from land 
grabbers. On the other hand, cleaning up the land title database will also 
allow the government to monitor all registered land titles and better enforce 
laws prohibiting deforestation.13 The goal of Law 11.952.09 is to grant 
300,000 pieces of land to private owners over the next three years.14 
This article argues that land reform that gives secure title to small farmers 
is necessary because it is the best way to address the intertwined social 
justice issues relating to the socioeconomics of poor and oppressed people 
living in the Amazon and the environmental justice issues associated with 
deforestation and climate change. This article will explore whether Law 
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11.952.09 is a viable way to preserve the Amazon while granting complete 
title to small farmers. 
In order to determine whether Law 11.952.09 is a viable option, Section 
II of this article will describe the historical and political background of land 
reform efforts in Brazil starting in the late nineteenth century through the 
present. Brazil’s current land problem began and has remained essentially 
unchanged due to the dominance of the agricultural elite that held sway 
over the government and effectively resisted both legal and social calls for 
land reform. This section highlights particularly notable reforms, such as 
the Land Statute, and shows how these reforms were undermined, 
abandoned, or avoided by the ruling class. This section also emphasizes the 
consequences due to the lack of meaningful reform—namely, violent 
conflicts in the countryside, the role of social movements such as the MST, 
and substitute policies such as market assisted land reform—providing an 
evaluation of the successes and failures of such projects. Finally, this 
section draws some conclusions about the viability for new forms like Law 
11.952.09 in light of the historical backdrop just described. 
Section III discusses deforestation of the Amazon rainforest in the 
context of the historical backdrop described in Section II and in the context 
of the current fight against climate change. This section addresses why the 
Amazon rainforest plays an important role in fighting climate change and 
describes why the type of land reform Brazil ultimately chooses for this 
region will have important implications beyond climate change. 
Section IV evaluates whether Law 11.952.09 can overcome the obstacles 
of past land reform efforts that left many rural farmers landless while at the 
same time combating climate change. This section argues that because 
traditional expropriative land reform has never enjoyed the political will 
necessary for it to be effectively implemented, this mechanism by itself 
cannot succeed in redistributing land to rural farmers. Similarly, although 
market assisted land reform was seen as the answer to the failure of 
traditional expropriative land reform, it too failed to bring about widespread 
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reform. Therefore, if Law 11.952.09 can combine the best of traditional 
expropriative land reform with the best of market assisted land reform, 
while at the same time incorporating positive environmental policies 
completely ignored by both, Law 11.952.09 might finally fix the land 
problem. 
Section V presents seven recommendations for strengthening Law 
11.952.09 to achieve its dual objectives. This section focuses on the need to 
make the provisions aimed at traditional expropriative land reform more 
robust. 
Finally, Section VI offers some concluding thoughts. 
II. CHRONOLOGY OF BRAZIL’S LAND REFORM LAWS 
A. 1887–1934: Establishment of Large Land Estates for the Elite 
The roots of Brazil’s land problem can be traced back to the Portuguese 
colonial practice of granting large tracts of land to individuals or families as 
political rewards and to encourage plantation agriculture.15 From 1887 to 
1934, Brazil strongly encouraged immigration from Europe and Asia to 
further the lucrative coffee and sugar industries that were major 
international commodities.16 This policy favored aristocratic groups and 
systematically denied similar access to large land grants to the nonelite 
members of the white poor population.17 The elite were largely successful 
due to African slave labor, but after slavery ended in Brazil in 1888, 
additional measures were enacted to keep former slaves from securing land; 
thus, maintaining a large permanent pool of cheap rural labor to serve 
agrarian oligarchs.18 As a result, the main feature of Brazil’s agrarian 
history is the formation and permanence of underutilized large estates 
throughout rural Brazil, usually termed “unproductive latifundia” in local 
legislation and general literature.19 
The question of land reform first surfaced after the revolution of 1930, 
which overthrew the coffee and sugar-based ruling class and precipitated 
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accelerated industrialization and urbanization in Brazil,20 but land reform 
was largely recognized as an obstacle to development. Consequently, 
though the National Congress considered dozens of agrarian reform bills 
during this time, none were passed into law.21 
B.  1945–1964: Industrialization, Democratization, and Capitalist 
Development  
Despite the 1930 revolution, the elite completely dominated access to 
private property until 1945 when Brazil experienced a cycle of 
democratization.22 By 1950, the first historical movement for land access 
took center stage.23 The demand for land reform was inspired by both the 
Cuban Revolution and proposals from a then-influential UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America. The latter group envisioned a process of 
capitalist development.24 However, the Cuban example encouraged a focus 
on the disparities between different classes. During this time, rural trade 
unions were forming and political action gained momentum with the 
formation of the Peasant Leagues and the semi-legal Communist party25 in 
support of land reform. Land reform was seen as a fundamental policy that 
would liquidate the political domination of land elites, contribute to 
improved patterns of income distribution in rural areas, and in particular, 
strengthen industrialization in Brazil after the formation of an enlarged 
internal market.26 
However, two barriers prevented reform from taking place: the powerful 
conservatism of right-wing parties in control of Congress and the 1946 
Constitution. First, large majorities of conservative politicians blocked any 
discussion of land reform, let alone proposals of changing the legal 
mechanisms of land reform and labor rights in rural areas.27 Second, though 
the 1946 Constitution had provided for the expropriation of idle land that 
was not performing a “social function,” it stipulated that fair compensation 
must be paid to the owner,28 in cash, at fair market value, before any 
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eviction could take place.29 These requirements made land reform 
impossible and, therefore, illusory at best. 
Because of the lack of attempts to change the constitution or to 
expropriate land under the impracticalities of the legal stipulations,30 by the 
late 1950s, violent conflict between landowners and tenants or squatters 
became increasingly common.31 As a result, the landowning elite called for 
a hard-line stance against the violence and lent their support to the military 
factions that promised to put an end to the social unrest.32 
C.  1964–1985: The Military Dictatorship, the Land Statute, and 
Colonization of the Amazon 
As promised, the new Brazilian military government embarked on a 
comprehensive program of land reform in order to quell social unrest. Soon 
after taking power, the military formed a working group to draft an agrarian 
reform bill. The “Land Statute” was the first government-drafted 
comprehensive agrarian reform proposal in Brazilian history.33 The Land 
Statute’s stated purpose was to promote “social justice” through more equal 
distribution of land. The statute governed rural development, implemented a 
land tax, regulated colonization, provided for technical assistance for 
farmers, and created the Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform to oversee 
its implementation.34 
The most important reform in the Land Statute was that land in Brazil 
was required to fulfill a “social function,” meaning that land must either be 
cultivated for production (and worked in compliance with labor and 
environmental regulations) or held for environmental preservation.35 
Otherwise, the land would be considered “illegal” and subject to 
expropriation (or government takeover and redistribution) provided the 
owners were compensated. Thus, the statute effectively outlawed holding 
large tracts of land for speculation purposes.36 
However, land owners remained politically powerful and resisted 
widespread land redistribution; therefore, the government’s commitment to 
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egalitarian land reform was limited.37 For instance, instead of distributing 
unproductive property owned by the elite, the military regime encouraged 
owners of large land holdings to modernize unproductive land by providing 
farming subsidies and pushing for soybean cultivation to generate large 
surpluses for export.38 The ample access to government-provided credit, 
together with the fact that soybean cultivation required large amounts of 
land, resulted in the absorption of small rural landholdings by medium and 
large-sized properties.39 Thus, land concentration increased during this 
period because the more land a proprietor had, the more credit he received 
and the more land he could purchase.40 Consequently, land reform in the 
form of redistribution remained untouched. 
Owners of large land holdings who did not choose to cultivate their land 
were able to avoid expropriation through two major loopholes in the Land 
Statute: the disproportionate tax structure and litigation. These two 
loopholes disincentivized large land owners from selling their properties (to 
landless families that might qualify for the rural credit discussed above) and 
allowed large land owners to drag out the expropriation process for years. 
The disproportionate tax structure overwhelmingly favored landowners. 
For instance, minifundia, or small rural landholdings, were taxed at a rate of 
68.7 percent of the assessment of their total value, while taxes on latifúndia, 
or large rural landholdings, often amounted to only 18 percent of what these 
large holdings should have had to contribute. 41 This means that it was often 
in a small holder’s best interest to simply squat on the land they were 
occupying to avoid high taxes. Conversely, because tax laws were not 
enforced and/or were easily avoided, large land holders had little incentive 
to break up their large parcels by the constitutional mechanisms in place. In 
fact, most large land owners simply did not pay any taxes or chose to pay 
insignificant amounts. 
Another major loophole was the option that landowners had to dispute 
expropriation through court litigation. Though the military regime did adopt 
legislation to simplify procedures and accelerate the process of land 
1116   SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
acquisition, this legislation also gave landowners the option of delaying the 
process for years through court litigation.42 For example, a local judge with 
geographical jurisdiction over land that the government decided to 
expropriate could allege various reasons to block or deny the government 
evaluators’ access to land, thereby slowing down the process. Given the 
common alliances among the local elites (including local judges), judicial 
decisions were often unfair and resulted in controversial readings of the 
law.43 
Additionally, if a large land owner could delay the expropriation by 
blocking the government’s access to their land, there was a chance that 
either underused land would be rapidly transformed into “productive 
economic activity” 44 or that the owner would take advantage of a better 
market price as a result of the delay. In the first instance, often occurring in 
cattle ranching land, neighboring farmers rush part of their cattle to the 
soon-to-be expropriated farm before any evaluator checked the actual use of 
land.45 In the second instance, land owners were able to use legal recourses 
ad infinitum through their ability to pay for expensive lawyers—essentially 
delaying expropriation by outspending the government in legal fees. In 
these cases, the process of expropriation may be delayed for years—because 
the government’s lawyer had to counter each of the large land owner’s legal 
acts until a final decision was made by a higher court, the costs of defending 
the government’s position spiraled out of control.46 While lawsuits were 
pending, the market price of the land would often go up; therefore, the 
landowner would often make more money by delaying a government 
takeover.47 
Another unfortunate consequence of the Land Statute was the expansion 
of exemptions to expropriation, which led to massive deforestation in the 
Amazon Basin. Medium-sized properties were exempt from expropriation, 
as were all but the very largest properties that were currently being put to 
economical or “rational use.”48 However, the definition of what was 
considered “rational use” varied from region to region.49 In the South, 
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cultivation was often required, but in the North Amazon Basin, clearing 
forested areas or use of land as a cattle pasture was considered productive 
use.50 Thus, large land owners clearing land or taking up cattle ranching to 
show proof of “rational use” were responsible for two-thirds of the 
deforestation of this area.51 
As for poor landless families, the government favored a policy of 
colonization on the new frontiers of the Brazilian center-west region, as 
well as portions of the Amazon, in place of reform. In the 1970s, the 
government took two actions. First, it launched a new federal agency, the 
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (“INCRA”), for 
the purpose of resettling peasant farmers.52 Second, the government gave 
INCRA jurisdiction over 30 percent of land in Brazil and 50 percent of 
public land in the Amazon. Poor families, specially recruited in the south of 
the country or in the poverty-stricken northeast region, were offered plots of 
wilderness land in areas still largely unoccupied if they agreed to relocate.53 
Many peasants agreed to relocate because land in the northeast was mostly 
titled and held by large land owners who allowed peasant farmers to use 
small plots in exchange for free labor.54 These small plots were often poor 
quality land, and the farmers suffered because of frequent droughts.55 In the 
west, however, there was more rain, as well as large expanses of fertile land 
considered to be public, and by law, people could gain a right to use that 
land—rather than own the land—by simply occupying it for a year and a 
day.56 Many farmers saw this as preferable to the situation they were in as 
tenants and thus agreed to relocate to the Amazon. In order to obtain a title 
to land in the Amazon, however, they had to pay fees and surmount 
bureaucratic procedures that were largely incomprehensible to the average 
peasant farmer.57 Consequently, as long as land was abundant, the farmers 
saw no need for titles. If a rural family was evicted by someone claiming to 
be the owner of the land, they would simply move to available land 
elsewhere.58 
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Some deforestation was also caused by the subsistence activities of poor 
farmers who used slash-and-burn agricultural techniques to cultivate 
forested lands. In order to plant land with crops like bananas, palms, 
manioc, maize, or rice, the land must first be cleared, and the quickest way 
to do so is with fire. For example, a typical process used by poor farmers 
might look something like this: understory shrubbery is cleared first, then 
forest trees are cut down, then after an area is left to dry for a few months, it 
is burned, and then planted with crops.59 Deforestation occurs with this 
initial clearing, but it is also exacerbated because after a year or two the 
productivity of the soil declines on the original plot, and the transient 
farmers must clear new forest for more short-term agricultural land.60 The 
old, now infertile fields are used for small-scale cattle grazing or are left for 
waste.61 
Ultimately, the colonization program was doomed to fail because it was 
poorly administered and did not involve explicit measures to provide 
infrastructure, adequate technical assistance, or local markets for small 
farmers. Nor did it have any provision for protecting land belonging to rural 
farmers against invasion by speculators claiming to own the land when in 
fact they did not.62 Additionally, in the mid 1970s, government priorities 
began to shift from peasant farmers to wealthy developers who wanted to 
develop large projects in mining, forestry, and cattle raising.63 
D. Export Agriculture Favored Over Large Family Farms 
In 1973, during its second stage of colonization, INCRA began to 
abandon its focus on rural farmers and instead focused on large producers. 
For example, it began to sell plots of 2,000 to 3,000 hectares (about 5,000 to 
8,000 acres) to larger land owners with an explicit goal of forming a rural 
middle class.64 Later that same year, INCRA sold plots as large as 50,000 
hectares (about 135,000 acres), justifying this as a means of attracting more 
capitol.65 
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One of the justifications for these large-scale sales of land was that they 
would create more jobs; however, not only did the jobs not materialize but 
these ventures also led to massive deforestation. These large plots were 
used primarily for mining and cattle ranching. Both ranching and mining 
initially appear to provide employment in the clearing of the forest and in 
the construction of mines and refineries. But once these businesses are in 
operation, they are not labor intensive and therefore provide little long-term 
employment for the average resident or migrant worker.66 Furthermore, 
these activities allow a relatively small percentage of large land owners to 
clear vast sections of the rain forest. Cattle ranching became the leading 
cause of deforestation in the Amazon during this era as government figures 
attributed 38 percent of all deforestation from 1966–1975 to large scale 
cattle ranching.67 
In sum, during the first fifteen years in which the Land Statute was in 
force (1964–1979), despite strong constitutional language outlawing 
speculative landholdings, the section related to agrarian reform was 
virtually abandoned.68 In total, only 9,327 families benefited from agrarian 
reform projects, and 39,948 from colonization projects.69 In fact, the Gini 
index of land redistribution increased from 0.731 in 1960 to 0.858 in 
1970.70 This shows that the small changes in the concentration of Brazil’s 
landownership over the past fifty years did not benefit landless farmers. 
These results led opponents of traditional land reform to argue that it had 
failed. 
E. 1985 to the Present: A Time of Conflict 
1. Social Movements—The Role of the MST 
The absence of effective land reform measures precipitated the formation 
of grassroots social movements putting pressure on the government to 
effectuate reform and, in some cases, taking reform into their own hands. 
The most powerful and active groups include the Federation of Rural 
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Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultural or 
CONTAG), the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT)—a group associated with 
the Catholic Church—a and the MST.71 This section will focus primarily on 
the MST because of its overwhelming success. 
Although agrarian reform in and of itself is not necessarily radical, the 
MST has emerged as the most radical and combative group in Brazil.72 The 
MST’s mission can best be summarized as “Occupy, Resist, and 
Produce.”73 In short, the MST fulfills this mission by finding unproductive 
land and then gathering enough people to take control of it.74 The MST has 
enjoyed widespread support based on their success, organizing 1.5 million 
landless members in twenty-three out of twenty-six Brazilian states.75 
The MST’s work does not end with the occupation and acquisition of 
land titles; instead, the movement’s success can be attributed to the MST’s 
ability to educate its members and maintain self-reliance. The movement, 
which is decentralized and highly coordinated, also provides its members 
with basic social services that the Brazilian government is unable or 
unwilling to supply.76 The MST boasts sixteen hundred government-
recognized settlements spread across twenty-three Brazilian states along 
with medical clinics for members and even training centers for health care 
workers. The movement’s educational programs are especially impressive.77 
Twelve hundred public schools employ an estimated thirty-eight hundred 
teachers serving about one hundred fifty thousand children at any one time. 
Adult literacy classes are offered to twenty-five thousand people through a 
UNESCO grant, and the MST also sponsors technical classes and teacher 
training.78 The landless workers have even established their own college in 
the southern town of Veranópolis. The MST also gives some students 
scholarships to attend other universities.79 
The MST claims their right to land occupations is rooted in the most 
recent Constitution of Brazil, which enunciates that land should serve a 
“larger social function.”80 Article 184 of the Constitution requires the 
government to “expropriate for the purpose of agrarian reform, rural 
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property that is not performing its social function.”81 The Constitution’s 
plain language does not give the MST the right to expropriate land by 
forceful entry; rather, it gives the government the right to redistribute 
unused land for social purposes.82 However, both the Higher Court of 
Justice (Superior Tribunal of Justiça) and lower state courts have declared 
that actions of the MST and other landless organizations might be 
appropriate under the Constitution.83 In one notable case, the Higher Court 
of Justice determined that “a popular movement attempting to institute land 
reform cannot be characterized as a crime. This is a collective right, an 
expression of citizenship, and it aims at implementing a program based on 
the Constitution. Popular pressure is an acceptable means in a Democratic 
State.”84 Similarly, in 1999, for the first and only time,85 the State Court of 
Rio Grande do Sul overruled a trial court’s decision granting a landowner’s 
petition to evict the MST off his or her property.86 The court reasoned: 
Before applying a law, the judge must consider the social aspects 
of the case: the law’s repercussions, its legitimacy, and the clash of 
interests in tension. The [MST] are landless workers [who] want to 
plant a product that feeds and enriches Brazil in this world so 
globalized and hungry. But Brazil turns its back. The executive 
deflects money to the banks. The Legislature . . . wants to make 
laws to forgive the debts of the large farmers. The press accuses 
the  MST of  violence. The landless,  in spite of all this, have hope 
. . . that they can plant and harvest with their hands. For this they 
pray and sing. The Federal Constitution and Article 5 . . . offers 
interpretive space in favor of the MST. The pressure of the MST is 
legitimate. [I]n the terms of paragraph 23 of Article 5 of the 
Federal Constitution [that land shall attend it social function], I 
suspended [the eviction].87 
This ruling is unique because courts will usually take one of two courses 
of action regarding the evictions of landless families. Sometimes a court 
will require the families to leave. Other times, a court will refuse the 
landowners’ request and allow the families to stay and engage in 
subsistence farming until the federal agency responsible for agrarian reform, 
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INCRA, is able to determine if the occupied property is indeed 
unproductive. This state court ruling is particularly promising for grassroots 
democracy because it takes neither of these two paths. Instead the court 
recognized the MST’s occupation of unproductive land as legitimate. 
Land conflicts are not always resolved in court; rather, violence has been 
used as a tool by the government authorities, landowners, and sometimes 
the MST itself. A notorious example of government-perpetrated violence 
was the 1996 Eldorado dos Carajás massacre where paramilitary police 
gunned down nineteen MST for blocking a national route.88 The people 
were part of a demonstration calling for the federal appropriation of an 
unproductive ranch where the MST had mounted a camp called 
“Macaxeira” with almost three thousand families. Over one hundred state 
military police surrounded the MST on the highway and fired tear gas, live 
ammunition, and machine guns into the crowd.89 In addition to the nineteen 
MST killed during the massacre, three more died later from injuries, and 
sixty-nine people were wounded.90 It was reported that many of the nineteen 
dead were shot at close range and some were even hacked to death by the 
protesters’ own farm tools.91 Via Campesina, an international peasant 
organization that advocates for land reform, claimed that state authorities, 
the police, the army, and powerful local landowners were involved in 
planning and executing of the massacre.92 
The brutality of the massacre got international attention and ultimately 
helped to positively influence both national and international public opinion 
of the MST’s mission of implementing agrarian reform in Brazil. For 
instance, the massacre triggered protests abroad (mostly in Europe) against 
the violence and impunity in the countryside, and helped to legitimize the 
struggle for agrarian reform in Brazil.93 As a consequence, the MST 
together with trade unions and federations linked to the CONTAG 
organized a nationwide movement to intensify land occupations in 
particular states like São Paulo.94 These increased land occupations also 
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increased social tensions and paramilitary violence by the large 
landowners.95 
The MST, along with other groups, put tremendous pressure on the 
Brazilian government to institute traditional expropriative land reform 
under the land statute. The 1990s in particular saw increasing pressure on 
the Brazilian government to address landlessness because traditional, 
government-administered mechanisms, like expropriation, were not meeting 
the challenge of widespread, efficient, cost-effective, and sustainable 
redistribution of land. Around the same time, the World Bank was 
proposing Market-Assisted Land Reform (MALR) as a solution for 
politically unstable developing countries, such as South Africa and 
Columbia,96 as more cost-effective, less conflictive, and complementary 
alternative to traditional land reform.97 The World Bank began to focus on 
Brazil as well when it began to observe the intensification of massive 
occupations and the radicalization of conflict as a danger to the current 
regime.98 As a result of the pressure from land reform advocates and the 
World Bank, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardozo (1995–2003) 
launched a new agrarian policy known as the “New Rural World” 
instituting market-assisted land reform, or voluntary land redistribution, in 
cooperation with the World Bank.99 
2. Ending the Violence: Market-Assisted Land Reform 
MALR is based on the willing-seller/willing-buyer concept, much like 
real estate markets in the developed world, thus avoiding the lengthy 
Brazilian expropriation land reform process.100 Under a MALR program, 
rural community associations are supposed to select a plot of land and then 
negotiate the price with the current owner. Then, once the purchase price is 
agreed upon, the association can obtain a loan from the government 
(financed in part by the World Bank) at a set interest rate to purchase the 
property with cash and then redistribute it to individual families within the 
association.101 This method was designed to increase the bargaining power 
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of and reduce the cost of land for individual families.102 Additional grants 
were available for community level infrastructure projects103 such as the 
purchase of seeds, farming equipment, and fertilizer.104 
Proponents of MALR argued that the “traditional model” of land reform 
had deteriorated and led to bankruptcy due to paternalism, authoritarianism, 
bureaucracy, centralized structure, disagreements, economic inefficiency 
and sluggishness, inadequate approach to the agrarian component, and 
incapacity to respond to the land market signals.105 In contrast, the New 
Rural World policy sought to address the failures of traditional land reform. 
First, it settled landless families under a policy of social compensation106 by 
bringing together willing buyers and sellers and, thus, avoiding rural 
conflicts and violence. Second, the policy decentralized land settlement 
projects, transferring responsibility from the federal government to state and 
municipal governments,107 mainly because local control was seen as more 
flexible than federal bureaucracy (who was responsible for delay). Third, 
the policy substituted the constitutional instrument of land expropriation 
with market-based land reform based on the negotiated purchase and sale of 
land.108 Facilitating land sales would allow the reform process to more 
effectively respond to the market and thereby be cheaper and faster than 
traditional expropriation procedures. Finally, the government was bound to 
take part in the new program as part of IMF-mandated structural adjustment 
programs as a result of debt.109 
The MST, along with other land advocacy groups, strongly opposed the 
substitution of a market-based system for traditional expropriative land 
reform, arguing that it would not complement but displace traditional land 
reform altogether. First, they argued that the World Bank’s justifications for 
MALR were not sound because they disregarded the power relations 
responsible for the historical deterioration of governmental institutions and 
legislation related to agrarian reform.110 In other words, if land reform had 
deteriorated and led to bankruptcy due the government’s failures, the reason 
was not traditional land reform per se, but the government’s unwillingness 
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to give it a fair try. Second, they also argued that the real aim of the 
government was to take ideology and politics out of land reform and 
thereby undermine grassroots support for rural organizations and people’s 
movements fighting for land. They argued that availability of money to buy 
land—coupled with talk of peaceful land reform, no more takeovers, etc.—
helped demobilize anyone wanting a piece of land to work.111 Third, the 
World Bank refused financial support to any measure related to the 
enhancement of the so-called traditional model of agrarian reform.112 
Finally, they argued that land is not merely a negotiable commodity; rather, 
land is also political, economic, and cultural.113 In rejecting the move 
towards a MALR model, the MST and other land advocacy organizations 
saw the new model as nothing more than a change in the state’s position 
regarding social problems and a policy incapable of promoting the 
democratization of the agrarian structure at the national level.114 
3. Evaluation of the First MALR Project: Cédula da Terra 
The first attempt to implement the model proposed by the World Bank as 
part of the “New Rural World” was the “Pilot Project at Agrarian Reform 
and Poverty Alleviation,” based in the state of Ceará, known as “Reforma 
Agrária Solidária” (Agrarian Reform and Solidarity).115 The program 
became popularly known as “Cédula da Terra,” literally “the land bill” (as 
in dollar bill),116 because of the money associated with the program. For 
example, between 1997 and 2000, US$150 million was made available to 
stimulate land purchases and rural development (US$90 million of which 
was borrowed from the World Bank).117 
The project basically involved creating a credit line for landless workers 
to buy land.118 Beneficiaries would organize in legally constituted 
associations responsible for directly bargaining the purchase of land from 
owners. Associations would then choose the farms to be purchased with 
bank funds, which—given state approval of the project—would go directly 
to the owner.119 The goal was to settle 150,000 families in three years (later 
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extended to four years) at a total cost estimated around US$150 million, 
with US$45 million coming from the federal government to purchase 
land.120 The World Bank’s US$90 million loan was to be used to fund 
complementary community investments. The remaining amount was 
committed by state governments (US$6 million) and a community 
counterpart (US$9 million), mainly in the form of labor.121 
The primary goal of the Cédula da Terra project was poverty alleviation, 
not land reform. The Cédula’s target beneficiaries were made up of landless 
wage earners, renters, and sharecroppers, as well as poor farmers without 
enough land for subsistence (minifundistas).122 Based on its goal of poverty 
elimination, the Cédula’s settlement program was considered a global 
success because it raised a considerable number of families above the 
poverty line through its promotion of land access.123 The program also 
showed that it is possible to settle one hundred thousand families per year, 
even with a series of financial limitations related to expropriations.124 The 
World Bank reported that the loan repayment rate by project beneficiaries 
was outstanding, and the government and civil society stakeholders—
particularly the CONTAG125—showed a strong commitment to the 
continuation of the program.126 
However, despite some success, MALR in Brazil has been highly 
criticized. The primary criticisms fall into four basic categories: (1) little to 
no influence in the negotiations, (2) ignorance of the conditions of the 
program, (3) lack of technical advice and poor quality land, and (4) lack of 
infrastructure.127 
First, a survey done by the Land Action Group confirmed that families 
had little or no influence over the choice of farms or the negotiation process 
that sets the price of the land.128 Instead, most of the negotiating was done 
by government officials who ultimately set the course of any deal, based on 
their knowledge of the funding limits and, at times, their personal 
relationship with the seller.129 Additionally, associations of beneficiaries 
created to administer the purchase of the land were often manipulated by 
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large landowners. In these cases, the workers often did not realize that 
negotiations did not favor them.130 On top of increasing the chance of 
corruption, these facts also revealed a tremendous lack of transparency in 
the negotiation process. 
Second, families were often discouraged from participating in 
negotiations because of their own lack of information. Interviewees 
revealed that they had no information on the project’s basic elements, 
especially regarding loan payment conditions.131 For example, except for 
the grace period and final payment term, none of the individuals 
interviewed knew their interest rates or even the amount to be paid in the 
first installment (which was about to come due at the time they were 
interviewed), much less the alternatives available if they were unable to 
pay.132 
Similarly, another Land Research Action Network study, done in 2005 in 
coordination with several grassroots networks such as the MST and CPT,133 
confirmed that many families never fully understood the terms of their 
loan.134 Only 53 percent of those interviewed affirmed that they had 
received a copy of the loan contract for the purchase of their land. Only 36 
percent had actually read the contract. In spite of having received the 
contract, 15 percent had not read it, which correlates to a high rate of 
illiteracy among workers.135 Of the families surveyed, 42 percent did not 
know the penalties listed in the contract in the case that they were unable to 
pay their loan. Among the families in collective contracts, this number 
increases to 48 percent. More than one-third of those interviewed (36 
percent) did not know the number of loan payment installments to which 
they had agreed upon signing the contract—26 percent admitted they did 
not know the number, 7 percent did not remember the number, and 3 
percent gave wrong numbers as a response.136 In short, all these difficulties 
could be traced to the fact that many of the beneficiaries were illiterate.137 
This lack of information demonstrates a large power imbalance between the 
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naïve farmers and the landowners negotiating on their behalf, but contrary 
to their best interests. 
Third, the lack of technical assistance and poor quality of land 
contributed to families’ inability to pay back their loans. Though situations 
differ in the different settlements—particularly in regard to soil quality and 
availability of natural resources such as water—the lack of technical 
assistance or funds for investment were the most frequent complaints.138 For 
instance, drought is a constant problem in the northeast; therefore, without 
investment in irrigation projects, land will only produce a relatively small 
amount for local markets, and the bulk of the harvest is reserved for self-
consumption.139 Consequently, low production on individual lots does not 
generate enough money to pay back loans, and its even less for the 
capitalization of new investments in production. 
Fourth, contrary to the World Bank’s findings, the Land Action survey 
revealed that there was a general lack of infrastructure on the land 
purchased by small farmers, making it difficult for them to maintain their 
families. For instance, 20 percent did not have electricity, 27 percent did not 
have potable water, 48 percent had no access to schools, 74 percent had no 
irrigation or access to water for production, 76 percent did not have a health 
clinic, 29 percent had no health practitioner, 72 percent had no ambulance 
service, and 22 percent had no public school transportation.140 
F. Historical Conclusions: Implications for Law 11.952.09 
The reality is that neither traditional expropriative land reform nor 
MALR have successfully redistributed land to needy rural farmers by 
themselves. While traditional expropriative land reform has the appropriate 
legal mechanisms through the Land Statute and the Brazilian Constitution 
to institute widespread, meaningful change, the implementation of such 
reform is highly unlikely given the historical lack of political will. 
Similarly, despite its difficulties and shortcomings, MALR has had some 
success in redistributing land in an efficient, cost-effective, and less 
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conflictive manner. Taking this into account, Law 11.952.09 recognizes that 
traditional expropriative land reform and MALR can be complementary 
alternatives. Before turning to the law however, it is important to 
understand the domestic and international environmental concerns on the 
subject of deforestation and, more recently, climate change. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER DEFORESTATION 
Starting in the 1980s, the international community began to express 
concern over the Amazon’s rapid deforestation as it appeared that the 
government’s land reform and settlement policies were accelerating a 
clearing of the rainforest.141 Between May 2000 and August 2005, Brazil 
lost more than 132,000 square kilometers of forest—an area larger than 
Greece—and since 1970, over 600,000 square kilometers (232,000 square 
miles) of Amazon rainforest have been destroyed.142 In many tropical 
countries, the majority of deforestation results from the actions of poor 
subsistence cultivators; however, in Brazil only one-third of recent 
deforestation can be linked to “shift cultivation” (a type of farming in which 
the land under cultivation is periodically shifted so that previously cropped 
fields are left fallow and subject to the encroaching forest).143 Instead, a 
large portion of deforestation in Brazil can be attributed to clearing for 
pastureland by commercial and speculative interests, misguided government 
policies, inappropriate World Bank projects, and the commercial 
exploitation of forest resources.144 
When faced with the pragmatic problem of how to deal with a huge 
landless population, and when untitled land is available in the Amazon 
Basin, it is not hard to see why government-directed environmental policies 
have taken a back seat to policies encouraging settlement.145 Deforestation 
occurs because it is in the rational, economic, and legal interests of actors in 
rainforest nations to cut the forest down rather than to preserve it.146 
Deforestation allows rural populations to practice subsistence agriculture, 
allows landless people to acquire a patch of their own, allows the private 
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sector to produce commodities and sell them on national and international 
markets, and allows local and national governments to generate tax income 
and foreign exchange.147 Additionally, nations are able to strengthen legal 
claim to widely uncolonized, unexplored territory and minimize border 
disputes with neighboring countries. In this way, developing countries like 
Brazil are only following the example of today’s richest countries, which 
actively pursued deforestation and land use conversion to agriculture in the 
early phases of development for exactly the same reasons.148 
Despite Brazil’s legitimate desire to continue to develop, Brazilian land 
conversion plays a particularly important role in combating climate change, 
because the Amazon comprises about one-third of the world’s remaining 
rainforests.149 Not only does the rainforest control the planet’s climate—
creating much of the rainfall pattern on which global agriculture depends—
but the rainforests are also home to some of the poorest people on earth 
whose livelihoods are linked to the land.150 Consequently, the type of land 
reform Brazil chooses is critical because it has direct effects on climate 
change, which poses both a global and local threat. 
A. The Rainforest and Climate Change 
Climate change is the result of the accumulation of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere, largely due to human interference, that has been going on 
since the industrial revolution.151 The general consensus is that countries 
have different historical responsibilities for the phenomenon depending on 
the volume of their emissions—known as “common but differentiated” 
responsibilities under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).152 Under this framework, the parties to the convention agreed 
that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases originated in developed countries, while per capita 
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low.153 Therefore, 
though all countries share in a common responsibility to address climate 
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change, developed and developing countries should have different roles in 
addressing the problem. 
Because Brazil is a developing country, it does not have quantified 
obligations to reduce emissions under the UNFCCC; however, Brazil has 
acknowledged a responsibility to help mitigate the effects of climate 
change.154 One of the most effective ways to do so is to reduce the amount 
of deforestation occurring in the Amazon rainforest, because worldwide 
tropical deforestation is one of the largest causes of global greenhouse gas 
emissions.155 
B. How the Amazon Rainforest is Important in Reducing Climate Change 
Tropical rainforests, like the Amazon, are important in reducing climate 
change in a number of ways. First, forest ecosystems decrease atmospheric 
carbon dioxide through photosynthesis and store it in biomass and other 
carbon stocks.156 This is commonly known as a “carbon sink”—a reservoir 
that absorbs or takes up released carbon from another part of the carbon 
cycle.157 Mature rainforests can carry up to eight hundred tons of carbon 
dioxide per hectare.158 In fact, one study estimated that old-growth tropical 
forest can absorb 4.8 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year through this 
sink effect.159 This means that there is more carbon stored in the rainforest 
then there is in the atmosphere.160 Consequently, when the forest is cut 
down or burned, not only is carbon not being captured and stored, but 
accumulated carbon is released into the atmosphere. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body tasked with 
reviewing and assessing the most recent scientific, technical, and 
socioeconomic information produced worldwide relevant to the 
understanding of climate change, estimates that the global forest sector 
accounts for 17 percent of anthropogenic carbon emissions.161 This 
percentage is greater than the entire global transport sector and larger than 
the annual emissions in the United States or China.162 Put another way, just 
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one day of tropical forest emissions from deforestation is equal to 12.5 
million people flying from New York to London.163 
Second, the rainforest provides an insulating belt around the planet, 
reflecting sunlight and evaporating moisture, which helps to cool the planet. 
The IPCC concluded that in order to avoid the worst climate change effects 
to occur as a result of warming two degrees Celsius, global atmospheric 
greenhouse gases must stabilize between 445 and 490 parts per million 
(ppm).164 The present atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is 433 
ppm and is increasing at 3–5 ppm per year.165 If nothing were done to 
reduce global emissions, global greenhouse gases will exceed 490 ppm in as 
little as twenty-five years. Though these numbers are dire, researchers 
identified reducing deforestation as one of the largest opportunities for 
carbon abatement.166 
Third, in addition to the opportunity to reduce climate change, the 
rainforest provides a host of other benefits such as regulating rainfall, 
controlling global temperature and disease, and providing for forest 
dependent plants, animals, and peoples. Also, the rainforest is a massive 
freshwater regulator. For instance, the Amazon rainforest collectively 
releases twenty billion tons of moisture into the atmosphere each day—this 
is eight to ten times more water vapor than an equivalent area of ocean 
evaporates.167 Some models suggest that deforestation could result in 
reduced global rainfall. For example, the water vapor from the Amazon 
feeds agriculture in South Brazil and may be carried as far south as the 
agricultural heartland in of the La Plata basin in Argentina.168 This is 
critically important because global food and energy security (in the form of 
hydroelectric dams) in this region is supported in large part by rainfall. 
The rainforest also controls the earth’s surface temperature by acting like 
a global air conditioning unit.169 Deforestation means the earth’s surface 
temperature will rise, which in turn, leads to more extreme weather 
conditions such as violent storms, soil erosion, and flooding.170 For 
example, Reuters News Service reported that extreme weather, linked to the 
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warmest year on record, caused the devastating floods in Pakistan and 
China last year (as well as the heavy rains in Australia late last year and in 
early 2011) which disrupted coal mines and damaged transport 
infrastructure.171 Damaged forests can also result in an increased frequency 
of disease; for example, the 2005 drought in the Amazon caused disruptions 
to high-quality drinking water supplies and natural medicines.172 
Additionally, diverse animal and plant life is threatened by deforestation 
and climate change. Brazil is overwhelmingly the most biodiverse country 
on earth, with more than 56,000 described species of plants, 1,700 species 
of birds, 695 amphibians, 578 mammals, and 651 reptiles.173 When 
compared with the United Kingdom (where there are just twenty-nine 
native tree species), every single hectare of rainforest contains dozens or 
even hundreds of species of just trees.174 As a result, that rainforest has been 
the source of compounds vital to the discovery and potency of many 
modern medicines and has provided the genetic stock for many new crops 
and plants.175 However, most species in the rainforest are still inadequately 
researched, and therefore, their potential value to humanity and the 
maintenance of environmental stability is yet unknown.176 
Finally, an estimated 1.6 billion of the world’s poorest people worldwide 
(those living on less than US$2 per day) rely to some extent on forests for 
their welfare and livelihood.177 These people include subsistence farmers, 
economic migrants, and “extractivists” such as rubber tappers, small-scale 
loggers, gold miners, hunters, and harvesters of nuts, berries, fruits, and 
medicinal plants.178 In Brazil, officially demarcated indigenous territories 
comprise 140 separate peoples and cover 20 percent of the Amazon 
region.179 
Ultimately, climate change threatens not only especially vulnerable 
populations, but also indigenous communities, local markets, access to raw 
material for medicines, and biodiversity essential for the planet’s continued 
survival. Therefore, the way Law 11.952.09 is implemented could have 
very far-reaching implications. 
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The next section will explore how Law 11.952.09 revives the innovative 
legal mechanisms of the Land Statute, while at the same time it encourages 
land markets to become healthy and robust through MALR mechanisms. 
Additionally, Law 11.952.09 incorporates important environmental 
protections that were not addressed by either traditional expropriative land 
reform or MALR. 
IV. CAN LAW 11.952.09 OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES OF THE PAST? 
A. Present Day: Killing Two Birds with One Stone 
Realizing the need to address land reform, continued social unrest, 
deforestation, and climate change, President Lula de Silva enacted 
Provisional Measure180 458/2009, which later became Law 11.952.09. 
Notwithstanding other federal programs implementing land reform-oriented 
settlement projects, environmental conservation, and the identification of 
indigenous lands, the Brazilian government still holds approximately sixty-
seven million unallocated hectares in the legal Amazon (approximately 
13.42 percent of the total area in the region).181 The goal of Law 11.952.09 
is to address the unresolved title question for more than three hundred 
thousand families living in the Amazon, who live on the more than sixty-
seven million hectares of land.182 The law establishes procedures—
especially aiming at rural conflict—to quiet title and settle questions of 
ownership for land claimed illegally or under questionable title. The law is 
also supposed to reduce deforestation by giving squatters legal title to the 
land they are occupying and making it possible for land owners to be held 
responsible for environmental damage. 
1. Land Regularization Plan 
Law 11.952.09 provides an opportunity for settlers to acquire title to the 
land they are occupying without sale or auction based upon proof of 
occupation or utilization.183 The titling plan is broken up into five different 
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routes based on the size of the parcel: land up to 100 hectares, land between 
100 and 1,500 hectares, land over 1,500 hectares, land given to states, and 
indigenous land.184 First, plots up to 100 hectares will be given to around 
290,000 occupiers for free, with ten-year titles of possession.185 This 
provision incorporates a feature of traditional expropriative land reform by 
implementing widespread land redistribution without a fee. However, this 
entails giving away public land, not redistributing land concentrated in the 
hands of one owner. Second, the government will confirm title of medium 
to large plots between 100 and 1,500 hectares at discounted rates, and 
recipients will have twenty years to pay for the land.186 This provision 
incorporates aspects of MALR, because beneficiaries who are able to pay 
for these medium-sized plots will help to grow the land market. Third, land 
over 1,500 hectares will be broken up into smaller plots, and the owners 
will be given government bonds, which will be paid over ten years after a 
three-year grace period. This provision also incorporates some of the Land 
Statute and the 1988 Constitution’s robust reforms, designating the 
government as the primary funder of land reform and appeasing social 
movements’ demands for land redistribution. Fourth, lands in 432 
municipalities located in federal areas will also be regularized for the 
benefit of the states. This provision will help to clean up the land titling 
database. Finally, Article 4 of the law specifically excludes land used for 
the military, public utilities, public forest, indigenous lands, federally 
improved land, and traditional Maroon (indigenous) communities’ land 
from regularization.187 
For a title to be legitimate, the squatter must meet five requirements. 
First, the beneficiary must show actual cultivation and occupancy as well as 
peaceful, uncontested development of the property prior to December 1, 
2004. In this way, the right to acquire title to occupied areas is retroactive. 
This provision reflects an intention to support long-term occupants and 
settlers in the region who have cultivated the land for years without the 
benefit of secure title. This also prevents recent speculators from taking 
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advantage of the law. Second, the beneficiary must be a Brazilian citizen—
native or naturalized. Third, the beneficiary cannot own other rural property 
in Brazil. Fourth, the beneficiary cannot have been the beneficiary of a land 
reform or land title legitimacy program at an earlier date. Fifth, the 
beneficiary’s main income must come from the economic use of his or her 
property.188 Finally, the beneficiary cannot be a government official.189 
Law 11.952.09 also imposes certain restrictions on titles granted under 
the program for title legitimacy, including restraints on alienation and duties 
to comply with environmental codes. For instance, title documents will 
contain conditions that apply for ten years, which if violated, require the 
beneficiary to return the land to the government. There are seven such 
conditions: (1) the owner cannot sell their parcel; (2) the owner must 
rationally and appropriately use the area; (3) the owner must properly use 
natural resources and conserve the environment; (4) the owner must register 
legal reserves; (5) the owner must identify permanent conservation units 
and recover degraded areas; (6) the owner must observe labor provisions; 
and (7) the owner must comply with the terms and method of payment of 
any loans, if applicable, within twenty years.190 
Another highlight of Law 11.952.09 is that rural properties owned by 
legal entities (i.e., corporations) are exempted from benefitting from the 
law. Instead, the sale of properties owned by the federal government to 
legal entities remains subject to bidding procedures under the Bidding Law. 
In this way, the law gives priority to low-income rural workers who develop 
the land for their own sustenance when bidding on land title from small- 
and medium-sized properties.191 
Ultimately, the immediate effect of Law 11.952.09 is that settlers who 
have been squatting on lands in the Amazon for at least five years can now 
gain legal property rights. As the size of the claim increases to the 
maximum of 1,500 hectares (approximately 3,706 acres), the burden of the 
cost and procedures placed on the claimant also increases.192 In contrast, the 
registration process for a free grant (for claims under 400 hectares) is 
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substantially less burdensome. This shows that the law prefers small-scale 
settlers of humble means already living in the Amazon; the law is not 
intended to enable large-scale, speculative land grabbing.193 The question is 
whether the Ministry of Agricultural Development, the administration 
responsible for the program, can carry out its implementation in a way that 
benefits small-scale settlers and not large-scale speculators? 
2. Who Benefits: Land Grabbers or Rural Farmers? 
Law 11.952.09 became law during a time of considerable controversy 
and public debate in Brazil regarding the wisdom of continuing a 
government policy of retrospective legalization of claims on public land.194 
Proponents of the law refer to it as a lifeline, finally granting title to resilient 
settlers and communities who have long forged their livelihood in the 
Amazon region.195 For example, a senator from the Amazonian state of 
Rondônia explained: 
[T]his provisional measure brings encouragement . . . to the people 
of the Amazon, who have been there for the past twenty, thirty 
years . . . Lacking any federal agency support, they settled 
themselves, occupying the lands of the Amazon, and for twenty or 
thirty years, they have waited for a solution such as this—for a 
titling process, documentation of the lands—in order that they can 
call themselves the legitimate, true owners of land they have 
occupied.196 
Proponents also argue that assigning legal ownership of occupied land 
will serve to combat land grabbing by the infamous grileiros and the 
associated violent disputes over control of valuable land.197 One senator 
listed the “reduction of serious and innumerable conflicts brought about by 
the absence of a legal framework [for land] in the Amazon” to be a key 
objective of the new law.198 Its proponents also assert that legalization of 
claims will help distinguish valid settlers from public land speculators 
involved in land grabbing (grilagem).199 INCRA, the agency responsible for 
implementing the titling process, has calculated that more than 80 percent 
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of the properties covered under the “Legal Land” program are no larger than 
400 hectares, implying that the benefits primarily go to small landholders.200 
The law itself applies only to claimants who assert peaceful occupation or 
utilization of the land, exercised continuously and without opposition.201 
Law 11.952.09 also corrects the legitimacy and representation problems 
associated with MALR. One of these problems is that lands were purchased 
by associations of workers organized by the large land owners or local 
politicians. The Sustainable Amazon Program remedies this by coming to 
the municipalities and interacting with the beneficiaries themselves. The 
Green Arc Action Group, the agency responsible for implementing the 
program, is in the process of visiting forty-three municipalities to register 
land, provide credit, and offer a variety of other public services.202 Because 
it comes directly to the people, there is less likelihood of corruption 
involving municipal administrators, politicians, and unions, who were 
favored in land purchase transactions under the World Bank program. 
Furthermore, politicians are not allowed to purchase land under Article 5 of 
Law 11.952.09.203 
Neither are landless farmers vulnerable to losing their land through lack 
of payment of high interest rate loans. Another problem with MALR was 
that the poor quality of the land prevented farmers from turning a profit, 
which in turn prevented them from making their loan payments. This 
resulted in the widespread indebtedness of rural workers. Between 1997 and 
2005, a World Bank rural credit program (Cédula) enabled land purchases 
through negotiation with large land owners. However, small farmers often 
did not participate in the negotiations and did not receive a copy of the loan 
contract for the purchase of their land.204 Even if they did receive a copy of 
the contract, many farmers did not understand the contract’s terms because 
of the high rates of poor education among the farmers.205 Here, under Law 
11.952.09, farmers occupying small parcels simply have to show that they 
meet the requirements and they are given title for free—no negotiation is 
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needed. This also avoids the chances of rural farmers getting into debt 
through loans that they cannot afford and did not fully understand. 
While the opponents of Law 11.952.09 point to many criticisms, most 
fall into two basic categories. One is that the laws presumably developed to 
support poor squatters who in good faith have settled upon and made 
productive use of public land may instead, or in addition, provide a means 
for powerful landowners and speculators to claim more Amazonian land. 
This, in turn, will not effectively address land concentration. The second 
main category of criticism, more generally, is that the continuation of post-
hoc policies legalizing claims on the public lands is counterproductive to 
Brazil’s ultimate goals for agrarian reform and environmental protection.206 
First, some groups have criticized the wide variety of beneficiaries 
allowed because it opens up the possibility for fraud. For instance, nothing 
in the law expressly prohibits a single person or company from regularizing 
as many properties as can be kept occupied by representatives.207 In fact, 
Felicio Pontes, Federal Prosecutor in the State of Pará said, “[Law 
11.952.09] will legitimize land grabbing (grilagem) in the Amazon and 
undermine fifteen years of intense efforts by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 
(Ministério Público Federal) in Pará to confront illegal appropriation of 
public lands.”208 Though one of the requirements for obtaining title under 
the program is that the beneficiary derives his or her main source of income 
from the land, it is unclear how this will be enforced when dealing with 
representatives. 
Second, critics argue that the regularization provisions promote land 
concentration. For instance, the average land occupation in rural settlement 
lots in the Amazon does not exceed fifty hectares, mainly due to the precise 
inability of a single family to operate on extensions larger than fifty 
hectares.209 However, the measure expands the number of hectares one can 
obtain up to fifteen hundred. This shows that the delivering of land assets to 
enterprise is the economic priority. 
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Third, under Law 11.952.09, the government cannot maintain its 
responsibility to implement massive agrarian reform for small parcels while 
maintaining a market-based approach for larger farms. Law 11.952.09 
abandons agrarian reform by designating areas over 1,500 hectares that 
should have been expropriated by the state and then turned over to INCRA 
for redistribution. Instead, the law puts these parcels up for auction.210 
Consequently, the law favors the elite because large parcels are only 
required to be broken up into 1,500 hectare lots, instead of smaller ones that 
are more appropriate for family farms. 
Fourth, other than holding landowners responsible for environmental 
damage due to new titles, the law does little to combat deforestation. While 
the law improves on traditional expropriative land reform that actually 
encouraged deforestation, it does little to stop illegal deforestation. Paulo 
Barreto, a researcher with Imazon (a nonprofit organization dedicated to 
protecting the Amazon) believes that the Legal Land program, together with 
infrastructure promised by the government, will lead to illegal occupation 
and deforestation. He observed: 
Regularization is essential to improve control over deforesting; 
however it cannot be so generous as to encourage new land 
occupation—especially when combined with promises of waving 
away fines. There is always the belief that land allowed to be 
occupied today can become legal property tomorrow. And this 
intensified occupation will, sooner or later, lead to more 
deforesting.211 
Similarly, Marcelo Furtado, the executive director of Greenpeace in 
Brazil, voiced concern that despite the government’s best efforts, the 
Amazon is too large to effectively monitor and enforce environmental 
violations. He said the following regarding the attitude of lawbreakers: 
[T]he . . . attitude is that because there is so little governance here, 
because the government is so absent the truth is that we can just 
keep cutting down the forest and nothing will happen to us. . . . 
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This bill will be a major signal indicating to the people who enjoy 
impunity that it is worth committing a crime in the Amazon.212 
Instead, more research is needed to determine whether the other five 
aspects of the Sustainable Amazon Plan better address deforestation by 
strengthening the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and providing 
tax incentives for sustainable development. 
In sum, most of the advantages of Law 11.952.09 show that it has 
effectively dealt with the failures of MALR described above, such as lack of 
technical assistance and the inability of farmers to pay back loans. 
However, the criticisms of Law 11.952.09 show that it does little to address 
the failures of traditional expropriative land reform—namely lack of 
government will and the power disparities between rural peasants and large 
land owners. Therefore, if Law 11.952.09 is to effectively combine the best 
of MALR with the best of traditional expropriative land reform, it must 
strengthen aspects of the law that allow for expropriation. As for combating 
climate change, it is still unclear what effect the law will have on 
deforestation, but it is likely an important step in correcting the flawed 
environmental policy of the past. 
V. SOLUTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING LAW 11.952.09 
Ultimately, despite its criticisms, Law 11.952.09 is an important step in 
improving land reform and environmental conservation in Brazil. As 
demonstrated, land reform in Brazil is a social, economic, and 
environmental justice issue—not only for the people of Brazil but also for 
the rest of the world. In light of this fact, measures should be taken to 
strengthen Law 11.952.09. This article suggests seven ways to strengthen 
Law 11.952.09: (1) Traditional expropriative land reform must be 
complemented by, instead of abandoned for, market-assisted land reform; 
(2) Brazil should revise and enforce the existing land tax; (3) Brazil should 
amend the existing legal procedures that are taken advantage of for the 
purpose of prolonging the expropriation process;213 (4) Brazil should 
1142   SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
prioritize family farming as a matter of social and economic policy; (5) 
social movements should continue their work for improvement, despite 
changing demands and institutional uncertainty; (6) Brazil should realize 
that government welfare, while cheaper than land reform, will not only 
undermine democracy but fail to cure the historical roots of inequality and 
injustice; and (7) more resources need to be allocated to environmental 
enforcement. 
First, traditional expropriative land reform must be complemented by, 
instead of abandoned for, market-assisted land reform (MALR). The 
international community and the Brazilian government should acknowledge 
that MALR, including mechanisms such as land banks and land funds, is 
inadequate in highly unequal societies and therefore cannot replace agrarian 
reform processes that expropriate large land owners’ land for redistribution. 
Expropriations should be undertaken in strict accordance with the rule of 
law, and land should be given to those who lack it.214 Law 11.952.09 is 
poised to implement a hybrid model designed to leverage complementary 
aspects of both traditional expropriative reform and MALR. 
Second, Brazil can strengthen the benefits that Law 11.952.09 offers to 
small farmers by revising and enforcing the existing tax structure, 
specifically the rural tax. Because tax laws are not enforced and can be 
easily avoided, large land holders have little incentive to break up their 
large parcels under the constitutional mechanisms in place. In 1996, under 
the Cardoso presidency, the Brazilian National Congress approved 
legislation concerning the rural tax (imposto territorial rural or ITR).215 
This legislation looked promising because the law reduced the size of 
properties subject to the top tax rate from more than 15,000 hectares to 
more than 5,000 hectares.216 In theory, this would have encouraged large 
land holders to break up their parcels by sale or face heavy tax burdens. 
Ultimately, large land owners lobbied Congress to reduce the tax rate on 
productive land. However, the government succeeded in raising taxes on 
unproductive land; the top rate for the largest estates rose from 4.5 percent 
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to 20 percent.217 This compromise shows that ITR could be a powerful 
complement to Law 11.952.09, because large land holders will have to use 
the land they are on or be taxed so heavily that it would be preferable to 
downsize. 
Unfortunately, ITR has yet to become a powerful complement because 
large land owners are notorious for avoiding ITR payments. For example, 
one 1999 study showed that 98.7 percent of owners of the two hundred 
largest properties were able to avoid paying the ITR. For the government to 
charge the top rate of 20 percent, it has to show that 30 percent or less of the 
rural property is being productively used.218 But given Brazil’s history of 
vague definitions of what constitutes “productive use,” landowners have 
shown great ingenuity in demonstrating land use and cultivating favorable 
rulings from local administrators.219 Current numbers show that, as of 2007, 
the ITR maintained a top tax rate of 20 percent, yet the lowest tax rate could 
be as little as 0.03 percent.220 This means that large land holders are likely 
avoiding ITR payments or paying very little. Conversely, because small 
holders lack the power and financial resources to similarly avoid ITR 
payments, they are likely shouldering the brunt of the tax burden, which 
hinders their ability to be successful. 
Third, Brazil should amend the procedures that allow for lengthy and 
expensive court battles over land, which only prolong and complicate the 
expropriation process. Brazilian law allows wealthy land owners to use 
legal recourse to fight expropriation ad infinitum because of the numerous 
loopholes for legal challenges. This problem is exacerbated when the 
threatened farmer is rich and is able to hire the best lawyers, in which case, 
the government must compete. This can lead to exorbitant costs, including 
countering every legal act the farmer takes until a final decision is made by 
a higher court. To date, no study has been done to estimate the cost of such 
legal disputes.221 However, a study would provide the government valuable 
information on what kind of legal reforms are necessary and indicate the 
best ways to implement those reforms. 
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Fourth, given Brazil’s unique climate, its amount of land, and the social 
and economic benefits derived from small family farms, Brazil should 
prioritize the small family farm as a matter of public policy. Small- and 
medium-sized farms are actually more efficient than large farms. Smaller 
holdings generally produce more than larger ones because an owner with 
secure tenure is more likely to make long term capital and “sweat-equity” 
investments than a cultivator with insecure tenure, whether measured 
hectare for hectare or according to total factor productivity.222 A study done 
by the Economic Research Foundation for the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development showed that family agriculture was responsible for 10.1 
percent of the GNP in 2003, valued at about US$55 billion.223 In addition, a 
spokesman for the Small Farmers Movement reported that 4.1 million 
families dedicated to small agriculture produce 80 percent of Brazil’s food 
and make up 85 percent of the rural labor force.224 Furthermore, the family 
farm more efficiently uses their land, creating a production value of 
US$677 per hectare, while farms not worked by families only yielded a 
value of US$358 per hectare.225 In sum, agricultural economists agree that 
small-scale farmers generally use land, labor, and capital more efficiently 
than large-scale farmers who depend primarily on hired labor or 
mechanized farming. Large farms only prove to be more efficient when 
measured by the advantages associated with tax breaks and subsidies.226 
Fifth, landless farmers and social movements can and should continue the 
struggle for land rights because they have been extremely successful to 
date. Social movements are in the best position to continue to advocate for 
institutional change in the face of uncertainty and difficulties. Zander 
Navarro suggests that one major challenge for the future of agrarian reform 
is the diminishing social demand for land in most Brazilian regions because 
the unstoppable process of urbanization has reduced the numbers of 
landless families demanding land.227 For example, in 1960, just over half 
(55 percent) of Brazil’s population lived in rural areas; however, the 2007–
2008 census revealed that only 15 percent of Brazil’s population lived in 
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rural areas.228 Now, industrial and service sectors dominate the economy, 
and agriculture does not produce jobs in the same proportion as it once did. 
This is due to mechanization and an increasingly technological policy 
prevailing in agricultural activities.229 However, even given this reduced 
number, an estimated five million poor rural families are still potential 
beneficiaries of national agrarian reform.230 Social movements should 
continue identifying and organizing these potential beneficiaries in order to 
make their interests visible to the legislature.231 
Sixth, given the cost of implementing land reform and the diminishing 
number of landless families, some have argued that it would be cheaper to 
offer a monthly payment to the rural poor than to work on the costly process 
of land reform232—this would be a mistake. For instance, the government is 
in charge of a host of social benefits for the rural poor—the most effective 
being the Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer program in which poor 
families receive a monthly payment on the condition that their children 
attend school.233 Because most studies indicate that new settlers in most 
regions of Brazil are not capable of producing a monthly income larger than 
the minimum wage, the argument goes that it would be better use of 
financial and administrative resources to simply enroll poor families in 
social programs instead of maintaining a complex process of land reform.234 
However, this would be a mistake because it only attacks the symptoms of 
poverty instead of digging up the root. Access to land creates a multifaceted 
impact in the lifecycles of landless families that would totally be 
undermined if land reform were abandoned and replaced with government 
welfare. The point here is not to recommend abandonment of social 
programs; to the contrary, social programs are a vital safety net that should 
not be abandoned, but to show that social programs in place of land reform 
is not a good idea. 
Finally, more resources need to be allocated to environmental 
enforcement. Being able to identify and prosecute potential law breakers is 
an important step in reducing deforestation. Not only will secure title give 
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new property owners a robust set of legal rights, such as the right to exclude 
illegal logging from taking place on their property, secure title will also give 
new property owners the responsibility to comply with environmental laws. 
However, in order for the law to be effective, more law enforcement 
officers are needed to patrol areas prone to deforestation and prosecute 
violators of environmental laws. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Land reform will continue to be a critical issue for Brazil as it continues 
to develop; therefore, Brazil must reconcile the tension between solving the 
problem of landlessness while at the same time protecting the Amazon from 
deforestation. 
Ultimately, Law 11.952.09 presents an opportunity to overcome the 
obstacles of both traditional expropriative land reform and MALR. 
Unfortunately, it appears that Law 11.952.09 might fail to accomplish its 
two primary goals of granting land title to three hundred thousand 
individuals and combating deforestation because it fails to adequately deal 
with the obstacles of the past. Instead, while Law 11.952.09 addresses some 
of the practical problems of market-assisted land reform, in the end, it 
relieves the government of its responsibility to institute widespread 
expropriation and redistribution of land under traditional constitutional 
mechanisms. Consequently, one expects to see a little dent into the 
overwhelming concentration of land among the elite and increasing rates of 
deforestation over the next three years if the law is not strengthened with 
other complementary policies. 
Undoubtedly, some families will benefit from Law 11.952.09. Instead of 
completely throwing the new law out, the government should enhance the 
constitutional and legal mechanisms already available. This would 
discourage wealthy landowners from holding onto unproductive land and 
would provide landless families access to important legal rights, thereby 
incorporating them into the global marketplace. Meanwhile, Law 11.952.09 
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